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Experimental Side Channel Analysis of BB84 QKD
Source
Ayan Biswas, Anindya Banerji, Pooja Chandravanshi, Rupesh Kumar, and Ravindra P. Singh
Abstract—A typical implementation of BB84 protocol for
quantum communication uses four laser diodes for transmitting
weak coherent pulses, which may not have the same charac-
teristics. We have characterized these lasers for mismatch in
various parameters such as spectral width, pulse width, spatial
mode, peak wavelength, polarization and their arrival times at
the receiver. This information is utilized to calculate possible
information leakage through side channel attacks by evaluating
mutual information between source and eavesdropper. Based
on our experimental observations of cross correlation between
parameter values for different laser diodes, we suggest methods
to reduce information leakage to Eve.




UANTUM Cryptography [1], [2] is gaining importance
with the advancements in quantum computation which
can make the present cryptographic techniques redundant. It
exploits the basic principles of quantum mechanics to generate
or distribute a secret key between two communicating parties.
This process is referred as quantum key distribution (QKD)
[2]. The goal is to ensure that message remains confidential
and inaccessible to a third party.
The first QKD protocol was proposed by Bennett and
Brassard in 1984 [2] and referred as the BB84 protocol. In
this protocol, the secret key bits are encoded in the quantum
states, for example, polarization of a single photon. The
states to be sent are prepared in mutually unbiased bases
(MUB).The intrinsic uncertainty in measurement of polariza-
tion in randomly selected MUB [1]–[3] makes this protocol
secure in principle. The security proof of the BB84 protocol
came much later [4], [5], which was followed by a security
analysis for implementation scenarios with imperfect devices
[6]–[8]. There are QKD protocols, other than BB84, which use
degree of freedom different from polarization. For example
COW (Coherent One Way), SARG04 use phase instead of
polarization to encode the states [9], [10]. These protocols
lag behind on efficiency and easiness relative to BB84 in
terms of practical implementation. All these protocols use
various devices which are not perfect in reality and can be
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prone to attacks [11]–[15]. To reduce the vulnerabilities in the
QKD protocols due to imperfect measurement devices, MDI
(Measurement Device Independent) QKD schemes have been
devised [16], [17], [32]–[34], however, their implementations
are much more difficult in practice. On the other hand BB84
has solid theoretical security backup [18], [19] against a wide
range of attacks and widespread demonstrations around the
world, which makes it a preferred protocol to apply in practice.
Even though there are several security proofs based on the
attack strategies of Eve but most of them assume the devices
and the optical elements used in the QKD setup to be ideal.
There is a possibility that Eve might know the weakness of
these devices and can work this out to her benefit in guessing
the secret key. This so called side channel attack [20], [21] is
very serious in any QKD system as Eve can get information
about the key directly from the devices that are being used.
One way to get rid of this is to use fully device independent
QKD, however, it is still not widely used [16], [17], [22]
since they are much more resource intensive unlike general
prepare and measure protocol such as BB84, at the same
time their key generation rate is quite low. Although one
cannot avert side channel attack completely but can make sure
that Eve’s gain is minimized. This information leakage [23]–
[25] to Eve will keep an upper bound on the key after error
correction and privacy amplification (PA) [26]. For properly
quantifying the amount of information going to Eve, one needs
to know the limitations in the devices that are used in the
QKD process. Devices at both ends (Alice and Bob) must be
calibrated in order to quantify the side information to Eve.
Device imperfections at the Bob’s end are easy to measure as
these can be verified through parameter estimation for QKD.
In the present article, we are interested in calculating
Alice’s information leakage as the vulnerabilities associated
with the source are highly prone to leakage. This is because
signals passing through the quantum channel can always be
under Eve’s surveillance. Therefore, the primary concern is
to evaluate the various source parameters for side channel
attack. For quantifying this, one has to calculate the mutual
information between the source and Eve. The inability of the
source to produce ideal states for QKD will give information to
Eve. This can depend upon various parameters characteristics
to the source. To know the amount of information leakage, one
has to meticulously calibrate the source for these parameters,
which could be wavelength, photon arrival time, or any other
parameter making the transmitted states distinguishable from
each other such that Eve can easily gain some information out
of it. Therefore, source calibration is essential for knowing
the mutual information between the source and the adversary.
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In this article, we calibrate our QKD transmitter consisting
of four laser diodes through cross correlation for various
parameters and use it to estimate the mutual information [6],
[27] between Eve (E) and Alice (A), unlike [23] that calculates
conditional probabilities to find out this information. The work
is divided into four sections. The first section describes the
basics of the method for calculating the mutual information
in our experiment. The experimental method used for this
is elaborated in the second section. In the third section, we
discuss the results of the experiment performed. In the last
section, we conclude our work with suggestions to minimize
the leakage to Eve through the side channel.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Mutual information is basically the correlation between
variables of the two parties involved in communication. It
quantifies the amount of knowledge one has about the other.
The mutual information between two parties Alice (A) and
Bob (B) can be written as [6], [18], [27]
I(A : B) = H(A)−H(A|B). (1)
H(A) is the information entropy Alice has about her variables
and H(A|B) is the conditional entropy of Alice given Bob
measured his. This can be further simplified in terms of
corresponding probabilities







where p(a) is the probability of occurrence of an event “a”
and p(a|b) is probability of happening “a” given the event “b”
has already occurred. The event “a” can be an outcome from
the space A, similarly “b” can be an outcome from the space
B and Log is taken in base 2. In practice this tells us how
much Bob’s information is correlated to Alice. The secret key
rate for reverse and direct reconciliation in QKD protocol is
given by [6], [19], [21]
rDR > I(A : B)− I(A : E) (3)
rRR > I(A : B)− I(B : E) (4)
where subscript RR means reverse reconciliation in which
Alice corrects the erroneous bits after sifting by comparing
it with the Bob’s key. DR means direct reconciliation where
Bob makes correct changes in the key by verifying it with
Alice after sifting. For secure QKD protocol this quantity
should be non zero. For rDR, rRR > 0 implies that the
mutual information between Alice and Bob (I(A : B)) must
be greater than Alice and Eve (I(A : E)) and Bob and
Eve (I(B : E)). I(A : E) can be found out if we know
the transmission channel and also the errors occurring at the
source and I(B : E) can be measured by looking at the
imperfections in the detection unit setup by Bob. If the two
parties happen to be Alice and Eve then Eq (2) can be rewritten
as [21], [23]







In equation (5), b is the outcome of Eve’s measurement in her
device. Given the outcome a at Alice’s side, Eve’s probabil-
ity to measure bit b is the conditional probability (p(b|a)).
In reality, Alice doesn’t know what method Eve will use;
therefore, for quantifying this information, the measurement
has to be done from Alice’s side. It means she has to make
sure how much Eve can guess about the states she is sending.
To calculate the conditional probability for a variable, we
use Bayes’ Theorem by taking the source’s parameter that
deviates from the assumed value in the implemented protocol.
Since we have used four different laser diode sources, due
to differences in electronic fluctuations in the driving circuit,
there may be a difference in wavelength (λ), pulse width
(w), and other parameters. Equation (5) decides the amount
of information leakage to Eve due to imperfections in these
parameters of the source. To characterize this quantity, we
need to measure the amount of indistinguishability between
various source parameters.
In Eq (5), the primary quantity that needs to be calculated is
the conditional probability p(b|a), as this quantity decides the
amount of information shared between Alice and Eve. Here,
the parameters in consideration are wavelength (λ), pulse
width (w), photon time arrival (t), polarization error at the
source, and spatial mode (x). These are the events occurring in
Alice’s system and the bit value that Eve gets after measuring
the states is b (it can either be 0 or 1). p(λ|b) can be calculated
with the help of joint probability distribution (p(λ, b)). We can
rewrite Eq (5) in terms of experimental parameters












Here, λ is the wavelength of the laser having a finite bandwidth
(FWHM). Λ is the space containing all values of λ. Just as
wavelength (λ), Eq (6) will be identical for other parameters
also. For pulse width Λ is replaced by W , similarly for
photon time arrival it is T and X for spatial mode. Estimating
I(A : E) as given in Eq (6) can be slightly time taking task
if we are implementing the QKD source in the field. Instead
we have come up with a method that can quickly give us
the amount of information leaked to Eve quantitatively. We,
need to calculate the cross correlation (R) between various
parameters of the two sources of the same basis in the QKD
transmitter to quantify the amount of information leakage. The




Equation (7) tells us about the similarity between the two
signals f and g as a function of ∆s. The quantity ∆s is
the shift of one signal with respect to other and the value
of R ranges from 0 to 1. The indistinguishability between the
sources can be known from R(∆s = 0) (more close to 1
means more similar to each other). Putting R(∆s = 0) in the
Eq (6) we get








R is the measure of offset of the parameters like wavelength,
pulse width etc. between the four laser diodes. It is impossible
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for Eve to predict the state of Alice’s signal after measurement
if the parameters of the sources are identical. p(λ|b) tells
about probability of guessing the correct initial state after the
measurement by Eve. This value is half i.e upon getting a bit
value 1 it is impossible to say whether it comes from source
containing λ1 or λ2. Deviation from this value basically gives
us the quantity of leaked information. R(∆s = 0) represents
the deviation from indistinguishability between the various
parameters of the source. By argument, one can say that the
quantity R(∆s = 0)× 1
2
is the guessing probability of Eve, so
this quantity can be replaced with p(λ|b). For exactly identical
states, the quantity I(A : E) will be zero as the parameters of
the source are indistinguishable which can be verified using
Eq (8). Therefore, measuring the cross correlation between
the various parameters gives a good idea about amount of
information leakage to the eavesdropper.
III. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
The schematics of the experiment is given in the figure 1
Fig. 1. Experimental scheme for measuring the parameters involved in source
characterization. For different parameters one has to change the measuring
devices. LD: Laser Diode, FPGA: Field Programmable Gate Array, PBS:
Polarizing Beam Splitter, HWP: Half Wave Plate, QWP: Quater Wave Plate,
M: Mirror, SMF: Single Mode Fiber, NDF: Neutral Density Filter, IF:
Interference Filter, DDG: Digital Delay Generator, BS: Beam Splitter.
In the setup, the measurement devices can be changed
according to the parameters that need to be measured for the
experiment. The scheme contains four laser diodes (ThorLabs
L808P010) with driver circuit [28]. The pulse width coming
out from the laser can be varied according to input bias
voltage. We keep the average pulse width around (650 ps)
and the repetition rate of the laser is 5 MHz. The laser
driver circuit is connected to stable power supply (Keithley
2231A-30-3) and FPGA (Arty A7) for driving it randomly.
The initial HWP and PBS combination is used for preparing
specific polarization states for encoding Alice’s signal. All of
the four sates coming out from the laser diodes are combined
in the 50:50 beam splitter and coupled to a single mode fiber
(SMF). The SMF is used to reduce any sort of misalignment
error in the four lasers. Then a combination of QWP, HWP
and QWP is used for compensating the polarization after
propagation through the fiber [31]. For measuring wavelength,
we just place an optical spectrometer (Ocean Optics HR4000),
for pulse width it is a fast photodetector whose output is
connected with oscilloscope for monitoring the signal. For
measuring the spatial mode we use EMCCD camera. Photon
Arrival time is measured by placing a single photon counting
module (Excelitas SPCM-AQRH-16) connected to time tagger
(ID Quantique ID900). The clock of frequency equal to the
driving frequency of the laser is sent to TDC for starting the
counting time of photon arrival. The histogram will give us
the knowledge of time of arrival of photons with respect to
clock.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Experimental results show that the proper source character-
ization should be done to quantify the amount of information
leakage due to side channel attack by the adversary. The fol-
lowing parameters have been quantified for indistinguishability
between the individual laser diodes of the BB84 source.
A. Wavelength
The mismatch between the peak wavelengths for the laser
diodes can give eavesdropper a chance of differentiating be-
tween different polarization states by looking at the mismatch
between the wavelengths. The figure shows the wavelengths
(nm) verses normalised intensity in terms of counts per second
(cps) for four laser diodes and their mismatch in terms of peak
difference.
Fig. 2. Spectrum of four laser diodes without using Interference Filter (IF)
The source is having the average wavelength of 795.6
nm.The measurements have been taken without putting any
wavelength filters. Figure shows the wavelength of the four
laser diodes in the Alice transmitter unit. The information
leakage due to wavelength difference between the four laser
diodes is calculated from the cross correlation between the
lasers is I{H,V }(Λ : E) = 4.3 × 10
−3 bits/pulse where the
subscript H,V denotes the information leakage in H/V basis
and Λ and E are the corresponding spaces on which a typical λ
and b belong, similarly I{D,A}(Λ : E) = 6.5×10
−3 bits/pulse
giving mutual information I(Λ : E) ∝ 10−3 bits/pulse.
B. Pulse width
The difference between the FWHM of the pulses (pulse
width) from the laser diodes can give eavesdropper a chance
of differentiating the transmitted states. In our setup, the shape
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of the RNG output pulses from the FPGA that are fed into the
driver circuit are identical but, the optical response of the four
laser diodes is not completely identical leading to a difference
in the pulse widths from each diode. Therefore, optical output
pulse of the laser diode is independent of the RNG pulses
fed into FPGA. This variation in the pulse width creates some
degree of distinguishability which can be exploited by Eve.
Eve can unambiguously detect the polarization states sent from
Alice just by looking at their pulse width variation in her
detector. For characterizing this error the measurement scheme
is modified by replacing spectrometer with photodetector. The
source has an average pulse width of 627 ± 75 ps as shown
in figure 3 . In QKD mode (sending qubits to Bob) pulse
height is made identical by applying different attenuation to
different states. All the four sources then have identical height
hence having same mean photon number (µ). The information
Fig. 3. Pulse width of four laser beam coming out from different laser drivers
leakage due to pulse width in laser diodes calculated from the
cross correlation between the sources is I{H,V }(W : E) =
9.2×10−4 bits/pulse, I{D,A}(W : E) = 1.2×10
−3 bits/pulse
with mutual information I(W : E) ∝ 10−3 bits/pulse.
Eve can design optimized attacking strategies based on the
knowledge of both wavelength and pulse width from which
she can learn more about the state. In fact, Eve can also
exploit all the side channels together which may allow her
to extract more information. However, it is too complex to
conceive a best attack strategy which is out of scope of this
article. Nevertheless, we will try to consider it in our future
work.
C. Arrival time
The arrival time of photons will depend on at what time
the photons from different laser diodes are leaving the Alice’s
QKD transmitter. The difference in the initial timing will give
a hint to eavesdropper about the corresponding states being
sent to Bob. Even if the optical circuit is perfect, the electrical
driver circuit which triggers the on and off time of the laser
diodes is subject to jitter. This will result in pulses from dif-
ferent diodes leaving the transmitter at different times causing
a difference in the photon arrival times. This can be exploited
by Eve to extract information about the states sent from Alice
to Bob by looking into the timing information that is disclosed
during the sifting stage in the QKD protocol [35]. In order to
know the amount of information that can be gained by Eve,
one has to measure photon arrival time. For measuring it, the
attenuated pulses need to be sent to single photon detector and
the output of that is taken from a time counter. The average
time of arrival of the photons is almost same for the four
laser diodes as seen in the figure 4 which in this case is 41.34
± 0.075 ns. The information leakage due to photon arrival
time difference for four laser diodes calculated from the cross
correlation between the sources is I{H,V }(T : E) = 3.2×10
−3
bits/pulse, I{D,A}(T : E) = 2.5×10
−3 bits/pulse with mutual
information I(W : E) ∝ 10−3 bits/pulse.
Fig. 4. Graph showing arrival time of photons from four different laser diodes
D. Polarization Error at Source
The use of optical devices in the transmitter to combine
the beams from four diodes into one may lead to many
imperfections. These imperfections may occur either due to
misalignment in the transmitter setup or due to imperfect
optics. Therefore, the generated states are not perfect in terms
of polarization and may contain error which may reflect in
the polarization extinction ratio in H,V as well as D,A basis.
This error may lead to information leakage to Eve. It gets
further amplified in the final QBER after the states are sent
to Bob. Figure 5 gives the errors in polarization. It shows that
from mismatch in the basis dependent error (in non-compatible
basis) Eve can extract information about the bits sent by
Alice. Error in H/V and D/A basis are eH/V = 0.0341
and eD/A = 0.0094 respectively and their mismatch is
∆e = |eH/V −eD/A|. While doing basis reconciliation in QKD
Eve can guess the bits sent to Bob by the data she already had
about this mismatch. So, information shared between Alice
and Eve is I(A : E) ∝ ∆e ∝ 10−2 bits/pulse.
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Fig. 5. Polarization error at the source
E. Spatial Mode
While doing free space QKD it becomes very important to
look at the modes of the signal that are propagating through
the medium. The spatial mode may be responsible for creating
vulnerability in the QKD source. If the modes do not perfectly
overlap with each other it may hamper the indistinguishability
of four quantum sates. If the four beams enter the fiber with
different injection angles then the output spot size distribution
will be different for different beams and is evident while
using shorter length fibre for mode cleaning. This mismatch
in spatial modes can be measured by EMCCD camera. For
making four spatial modes overlap with each other one needs
to couple them into a short length single mode fiber. Earlier
work has not given much emphasis on mismatch among spatial
modes as they amounted to very less leakage [23] but here
we show that if Eve has a very low pixel size camera then
she could measure the mode mismatch in four laser diodes.
Experimental scheme remains the same as in figure 1 only this
time EMCCD camera is used instead of spectrometer. Images
of spatial modes of four laser diodes are recorded in EMCCD
camera. Figure 6 shows the spatial mode distribution of these
four laser diodes. The information leakage due to spatial mode
difference for the four laser diodes calculated from the cross
correlation between them is I{H,V }(X : E) = 4.2 × 10
−3
bits/pulse, I{D,A}(X : E) = 4.5×10
−3 bits/pulse with mutual
information I(X : E) ∝ 10−3 bits/pulse.
The highlight of the present work which makes it different
from [23] is the consideration of new parameters that can also
contribute to the information leakage. Pulse width variation is
an important parameter in the source which gives rise to side
channel information to the adversary. Our work quantifies this
leakage of information to Eve due to pulse width mismatch
between four laser diodes. Secondly, the polarization error in
different bases at the source is also an important quantity
which sets a bound in the side channel information to Eve.
Lastly, it has been shown that leakage can take place if Eve
uses detector with smaller pixel size to find the spatial mode
Fig. 6. Images of beams taken at the out of the fiber which are coming from
four laser diodes
distribution of four states. The smaller the pixel size, the
better the Eve will be able to discriminate four spatial modes
with higher certainty. However, [23] concludes that spatial
measurements leads to negligible information leakage.
In the given reference [23], to find out the information leak-
age, laborious way of calculating the conditional probabilities
has been used. Instead we use the cross correlation technique,
which is much more experiment friendly, simple and also gives
a good estimation of the side channel leakage in the QKD
source.
V. CONCLUSION
In the present work we have characterized the various
source parameters that can lead to possible side channel
attack. Using cross correlation function for calculating mutual
information between Alice and Eve gives quite good results.
This method is simple and can be easily implemented in the
field which can give real-time values for possible information
leakage. In our setup parameters such as pulse width and
spatial mode contributes less to side channel information to
Eve. The information leakage once quantified can be crucial
for extracting the secret key after privacy amplification. This
mutual information can further be decreased by correcting the
optical and the electronic elements in the source. To make a
better BB84 source, one has to make sure that the states that
are being created must be as indistinguishable as possible.
This makes very difficult for Eve to guess the states correctly
by knowing the parameters of the source. For wavelength
mismatch one can put very narrow bandwidth filters which
can decrease the the overall FWHM as well as the peak to
peak mismatch between the four laser diodes. Using precise
temperature control and stabilization methods one can reduce
the wavelength mismatch between the four laser diodes. For
making the pulse width of the laser diodes same, one can
build a common laser driver circuit for them. For making
arrival times same for all the four laser diodes one has to
put fast delay generator in the driving circuit. For removing
spatial mode mismatch, one can use long length fiber for mode
cleaning. For reducing polarization error, one can use polar-
ization maintaining fiber and broad-band optical elements in
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the setup. The parameters mainly contributing to information
leakage are wavelength and polarization errors which need
special attention while developing the QKD source. Earlier
spatial mode was thought to be contributing less in information
leakage [23], [29] but if Eve has good resolution camera,
then she can guess the states with more confidence. Pulse
width mismatch contributes less in this leakage and can be
overlooked if the bit length of the secure key is not the matter
of concern.
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